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Following the much anticipated Supreme Court of Canada decision in Beals v. Saldanha1, the
"real and substantial connection" test established in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye 2
was extended to apply equally to the recognition of foreign judgments.3 Thus, the principles
of comity, reciprocity and order and fairness4 were held to apply to originating actions
commenced in Canada involving foreign litigants (either as plaintiff or defendant).
Moreover, the Beals v. Saldanha decision confirmed that where the “real and substantial
connection” test is otherwise met (i.e. consent-based jurisdiction, presence-based jurisdiction
or assumed jurisdiction)5 the only available defences to a domestic defendant seeking to have
a Canadian court refuse enforcement of a foreign judgment are fraud, natural justice and
public policy.6 Some commentators have expressed concern that the Beals v. Saldanha
decision will potentially expose Canadian defendants to exorbitant U.S. jury awards, which
often include treble and punitive damages which far exceed comparable Canadian damage
assessments.7
In the wake of Beals v. Saldanha, the scope and applicability of the defences of natural justice
and public policy were recently appraised by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Court
of Appeal in The United States of America v. Shield Development Co.8
In USA v. Shield, U.S. Department of Justice (Environmental Enforcement Section,
Environment and Natural Resources Division) [“USA”] sought to recover environmental
clean-up costs in removing hazardous substances from the Essex copper processing site in
Milford, Beaver County, Utah originally owned by two Canadian corporations, The Shield
Development Co. Ltd. ["Shield"] and Anyox Metals Ltd. ["Anyox"]. Shield operated a
processing facility on the site under a lease from 1969 to 1971. In 1971, Shield subleased the
facility to Essex Group International [“Essex”] who operated it from 1971 to 1974. In 1979,
ownership of the property was transferred to Shield. In 1984, Shield sold the property to
Anyox pursuant to a power of sale. The transfer was not registered and Shield remained as
the registered titleholder. John Patrick Sheridan is the president of both Shield and Anyox.
Both Shield and Anyox denied they had caused the environmental pollution and alleged that
it had been caused by Essex. 9 The U.S.A. then commenced proceedings in the United States
District Court in Utah under federal jurisdiction,10 seeking declaratory judgment against
Shield and Anyox for the USA’s environmental clean-up costs pursuant to section 107 of
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).11
Following a labyrinthine procedural history,12 the USA eventually obtained “summary
judgment” jointly and severally against Shield and Anyox in the amount of US$242,614.93
plus costs. The U.S.A. then commenced an action in Ontario to enforce its Utah judgment
and moved for summary judgment before Herman, J.. Shield and Anyox resisted the motion
and argued that there were two triable issues: (1) whether the steps taken by U.S.A. to obtain
judgment in Utah amounted to a breach of natural justice due to ineffective or improper
service on the defendants of a number of court documents; and (2) whether the U.S.A.'s
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decision to sue two Canadian corporations and not the American corporation responsible
for the environmental pollution was contrary to public policy. Herman, J. rejected the
defences of natural justice and public policy and granted summary judgment against Shield
and Anyox. 13 In a brief endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed Shield and
Anyox’s appeal stating in part:
[3] As stated by the respondent, the real essence of this matter is that the appellants had
received adequate notice of the U.S. proceeding and had adequate opportunity to raise any
defence of fact and law before the U.S. District Court. In effect, they now plead the
consequences of their decision to walk away from the U.S. proceeding, to which they attorned,
in an attempt to create a triable issue. Moreover, when the appellants learned of the U.S.
judgment, neither appellant appealed nor moved to have the judgment set aside. 14

My thesis is that the defence of natural justice mandates that “form follow function”.15
Procedural rules (the “form”) must be predicated on the intended purpose (“order and
fairness”). Although USA v. Shield is also informative in respect of the public policy
defence,16 the Ontario court’s analysis of the defence of natural justice begs scrutiny for
three reasons.
First, the defence of natural justice is the fulcrum between the principles of order and
fairness that forms the basis for foreign judgment enforcement. The judicial distemper
exhibited in the majority and dissenting opinions in Beals v. Saldanha, was no less muted in
the divided court’s analysis of the defence of natural justice. Justice Major, writing for the
six-to-three majority, 17 disagreed generally with Justice Lebel’s “purposive and flexible”
approach18 to the traditional defences and downplayed the significance of lack of notice and
unfamiliarity with foreign legal procedure. According to Major, J., the defence of natural
justice requires the enforcing court to determine whether the defendant was granted fair
process by the foreign legal system when the foreign court granted judgment. Fair process is
one that “reasonably guarantees basic procedural safeguards such as judicial independence
and fair ethical rules governing the participants in the judicial system.” It also includes a
requirement that the defendant be given adequate notice of the claim and an opportunity to
defend. Major, J. further noted that this “assessment is easier when the foreign legal system
is either similar to or familiar to Canadian courts.” 19 Justice Major defined the defence of
natural justice as follows:
The defence of natural justice is restricted to the form of the foreign procedure, to due
process, and does not relate to the merits of the case. The defence is limited to the procedure
by which the foreign court arrived at its judgment. However, if that procedure, while valid
there, is not in accordance with Canada's concept of natural justice, the foreign judgment will
be rejected. The defendant carries the burden of proof and, in this case, failed to raise any
reasonable apprehension of unfairness.20

Justice Major further noted:
In Canada, natural justice has frequently been viewed to include, but is not limited to, the
necessity that a defendant be given adequate notice of the claim made against him and that he
be granted an opportunity to defend….
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LeBel J. would expand the defence of natural justice by interpreting the right to receive notice
of a foreign action to include notice of the legal steps to be taken by the defendant where the
legal system differs from that of Canada’s and of the consequences flowing from a decision to
defend, or not defend, the foreign action. Where such notice was not given, he would deny
enforcement of the resulting judgment. No such burden should rest with the foreign plaintiff. Within
Canada, defendants are presumed to know the law of the jurisdiction seized with an action against them.
Plaintiffs are not required to expressly or implicitly notify defendants of the steps that they must take when
notified of a claim against them. This approach is equally appropriate in the context of international
litigation. To find otherwise would unduly complicate cross-border transactions and hamper trade with
Canadian parties. A defendant to a foreign action instituted in a jurisdiction with a real and substantial
connection to the action or parties can reasonably be expected to research the law of the foreign
jurisdiction…[emphasis added]21

Conversely, Justice Le Bel argued that the defence of natural justice “concerns the procedure
by which the foreign court reached its decision.”22 If a defendant can establish that the
process by which the foreign judgment was obtained was contrary to the Canadian
conception of natural justice, then the foreign judgment should not be enforced.23
Furthermore, Le Bel, J. suggested that adequate notice should include "alerting the defendant
to the consequences of any procedural steps taken or not taken . . . as well as to the
allegations that will be adjudicated at trial.”24
In a separate dissent, Binnie, J. voiced similar concerns:
Proper notice is a function of the particular circumstances of the case giving rise to the foreign default judgment.
In this case, in my view, there was a failure of notification amounting to a breach of natural justice. In these
circumstances, the Ontario courts ought not to give effect to the Florida judgment.
…
When a Canadian resident is served with a legal process from within his or her own
jurisdiction, he or she is presumed to know the law and the risks attendant with the notice.
There can be no such presumption across different legal systems.
As the basis of the respondents’ judgment is default of pleading, this lack of notification goes to
the heart of the present appeal.25

The defence of natural justice is essentially a restatement of the well-established legal
principle of “audi alteram partem”26 or "hear the other party"27 requiring that the parties to a
dispute be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.28 Put another way, without
procedural justice, order trumps fairness. The defence of natural justice is further
adumbrated by Professor Lawrence Slocum in his article “Procedural Justice” wherein the
learned author states:
The Participation Principle requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes
be structured to provide each interested party with a right to adequate participation. The
Accuracy Principle requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes should be
structured so as to maximize the chances of achieving the legally correct outcome in each
proceeding. Together, the two principles provide guidance where guidance is needed, both for
the architects of procedural design and reform and for judges who apply general procedural
rules to particular cases.29
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Second, the factual and evidentiary record and procedural history in USA v. Shield both
demonstrate that the standards of American due process and Canadian procedural fairness
differ in material respects vis-à-vis default and/or summary judgments.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the rights of unrepresented (pro se)30 corporate
defendants to notice and right of appearance in U.S. federal and state courts are markedly
different than those in Canada generally, and in Ontario, specifically. Therefore, a
comparative analysis of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, local Utah State Rules and
the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure will identify the need for further refinement and
potential factors in applying the defence of natural justice in the context of foreign default
judgment enforcement.
Factual Background
From June 1st to June 3rd, 1992, the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of
Environmental Response and Remediation ("DERR") inspected the Essex site and took
samples. By letter dated April 5, 1993, DERR reported the results to Mr. Sheridan, president
of both Shield and Anyox, and further requested that Shield and Anyox enter into an
agreement to perform a complete assessment of the environmental threats associated with
the site. DERR sent a follow-up letter on December 22, 1993 but Shield and Anyox failed to
respond to either letter. On February 28, 1994, DERR notified the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") of its findings. On May 26, 1994, as a result of its own
investigations, the EPA requested funds to perform "time critical removal action". On
January 6, 1995, the EPA sent a "Notice of Potential Liability and Request for Information"
by registered mail to Shield’s registered corporate address at 150 York Street, Suite #1614,
Toronto (to Mr. Sheridan’s attention as president of Shield) informing Shield that it was
potentially liable for clean-up costs. Interestingly, the essentially identical Notice of Potential
Liability was faxed to Mr. Sheridan, on behalf of Anyox, on February 28, 1995, but the USA
conceded that it was sent by registered mail to an incorrect address (#7 King Street East,
#1404, Toronto). 31
On March 3, 1995, the EPA began its removal, cleanup and disposal of the onsite
contaminants.32 On March 22, 1995, the EPA then sent a "Second Issuance of General
Notice and Information Request" to Mr. Sheridan as president of Anyox, to which Mr.
Sheridan responded on April 19, 1995 and May 2, 1995, on behalf of Anyox and Shield,
respectively. The EPA then sent a “Demand for Payment” letter to Mr. Sheridan, as
President of Anyox, dated September 26 1995 for the removal costs in the amount of
US$103,353.69, to which Mr. Sheridan did not respond. The EPA sent a second demand for
payment to Mr. Sheridan on July 1, 1996, and advised him that the costs now totalled
$162,935.00 plus US$14,653.78. Notably, although the EPA also sent the same “Demand for
Payment” letters to Essex Group, Inc., apparently without reply, it elected to sue only Shield
and Anyox under the CERCLA environmental legislation. 33
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Utah District Court Procedural History
The following is a chronology of events leading to the Utah District Court judgment:
May 26, 1998 -- U.S.A. commences an action against Shield and Anyox in the United States
District Court in Utah.34
July 13, 1998 -- The Complaint is served on Shield and Anyox through personal service on
Mr. Sheridan at his home at 14 Parklane Circle, Don Mills, Ontario, by leaving a copy of a
"Summons in a Civil Action" and a copy of the Complaint (similar to a Statement of Claim
in Ontario) with Marjorie Sheridan, Mr. Sheridan’s spouse pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1) of the
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter “Fed. R. Civ. P.”] 35
July 27, 1998 -- Ontario counsel agent retained by the U.S. Department of Justice writes a
letter confirming that the process server had served the Complaints and Summons on Mr.
Sheridan at his home at 14 Parklane Circle (home address). He stated that the “corporations
vacated their business address at Suite 1614, 150 York Street Toronto [corporate address] in
mid-April/early May 1998 and Mr. Sheridan now operates from his home.”36
August 26, 1999 -- Shield and Anyox retain counsel in Utah who file Answers to the
Complaint (similar to a Statement of Defence). Neither of the corporate defendants

contests jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court, albeit choice of venue is not
preliminarily conceded. 37 38

November 23, 1998 -- the USA submits its Initial Disclosures.39
December 2, 1998 – Defendants' Utah counsel submits their Initial Disclosures which
incorrectly states that the defendants' corporate address is 150 York St., Toronto.40
September 3, 1999 – Defendants’ Utah Counsel files a motion to withdraw as counsel on the
basis that they had not received payment and that Mr. Sheridan had not communicated with
them. The motion is served on the defendants by mailing them a copy to the corporate
address. The motion materials indicate that the defendant's address is the corporate
address.41
September 9, 1999 -- the USA serves its "First Set of Requests for Admissions" 42 on Shield
and Anyox pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. by serving their Utah counsel and by
mistakenly sending it to the defendants at “150 New York St.”, a non-existent Toronto
address, instead of 150 York St, the former corporate address which Shield and Anyox
abandoned in 1998 but maintained a mailbox until 2003.43
September 10, 1999 -- the U.S. District Court grants Utah counsel’s motion to withdraw
pursuant to Rule 83-1.4(a)(2) of the Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for
the District of Utah [the local Fed. R. Civ. P.] effective on September 14, 1999. A copy of
that order is mailed to Shield and Anyox at the former corporate address. 44
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December 16, 1999 -- the United States files a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis
that Shield and Anyox has failed to respond to the Request for Admissions and were
therefore deemed to have admitted the Requests. A copy of that motion is also mistakenly
sent to “150 New York St.”. Unsurprisingly, neither Shield nor Anyox file a response to the
Motion for Summary judgment. 45
February 5, 2000 -- Judge Ted Stewart of the U.S. District schedules a hearing date on April
12, 2000. Copies of the order setting the hearing date are sent to Shield and Anyox at what
Justice Herman regards as the “correct” corporate address. 46
June 19, 2000 -- Judge Stewart grants Judgment to the USA following the defendants’ failure
to respond or appear at the hearing.47A copy of the order is mailed to Shield and Anyox at
the “correct” corporate address. Justice Herman observed that neither Shield nor Anyox
appeal the order nor move to set it aside within the one-year limitation period under Rule
60(b)(1) of the Fed. R. Civ. P., noting that:
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a final judgment in
a variety of situations including "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect". The
rule provides that motions to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(1) must be made within one year
after the judgment was entered or taken. The defendants submit that they are therefore
precluded from moving to set aside the judgment, since they were not aware of the judgment
until after the one year had passed.
The plaintiff argues, however, that the defendants could seek a remedy under Rule 60(b)(6) for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment". The time limitation for
that provision is not one year, but is "within a reasonable time". 48

Comparative Procedural Analysis
The American and Canadian laws of civil procedure are generally thought to be similar,
having derived from the same historical antecedents of English common law. Furthermore,
determining procedural fairness is necessarily subjective: a domestic court presumes that its
own legal system and rules of procedure are fair to litigants. Nevertheless, the defence of
natural justice is best considered by juxtaposing both procedural regimes under the following
four categories:
(1) Withdrawal or removal as counsel of record;
(2) Standing for unrepresented (pro se) corporate litigants;
(3) Sanctions for failure to respond to requests to admit; and
(4) Legal standard for summary judgment and default judgment.
(1) Withdrawal or removal as counsel of record
Utah Counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel of record was brought on September 3, 1999.
The US served its "First Set of Requests for Admissions" on Utah Counsel and to the wrong
corporate address in Toronto. Judge David Sam allowed withdrawal of defendants' counsel
by Order dated September on September 10, 1999 pursuant to Rule 83.1.4(a)(2) of the Utah
Federal Rules of Practice which reads in part:
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DUCivR 83-1.4 ATTORNEYS - WITHDRAWAL OR REMOVAL OF ATTORNEY
(a) Withdrawal and Substitution. No attorney will be permitted to withdraw or be
substituted as attorney of record in any pending action except by written application and by
order of the court. All applications for withdrawal must set forth the reasons therefor, together
with the name, address, and telephone number of the client, as follows:
...

(2) Without Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has not obtained the
written consent of the client, the application must be in the form of a motion that
must be served upon the client and all other parties or their attorneys. The motion must
be accompanied by a certificate of the moving attorney that (i) the client has been notified in writing of
the status of the case including the dates and times of any scheduled court proceedings, pending
compliance with any existing court orders, and the possibility of sanctions; or (ii) the client cannot be
located or, for whatever other reason, cannot be notified of the pendency of the motion and the status of
the case. 49

(b) Responsibilities of Party Upon Removal. Whenever an attorney withdraws or dies, is
removed or suspended, or for any other reason ceases to act as attorney of record, the party
represented by such attorney must notify the clerk of the appointment of another attorney or of his decision to
appear pro se within twenty (20) days or before any further court proceedings are conducted. If substituting
counsel, the party also must provide the clerk with the name, current telephone number,
address, and, where applicable, Utah State Bar identification number of substituting counsel. If
the party is proceeding pro se, the party must provide the party's address and telephone number to the clerk. 50
[emphasis added]

Conversely, Rule 74 (formerly 4-506) of the local Utah State Rules provides as follows:
Rule 74. Withdrawal of Counsel
(a) If a motion is not pending and a certificate of readiness for trial has not been filed, an
attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on all parties a notice
of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address of the attorney’s client and a
statement that no motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If a
motion is pending or a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an attorney may not
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe
the nature of any pending motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing.
(b) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the
case by the court, the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented
party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to
Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until
20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party waives the time
requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. [emphasis added]
(c) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing and serving
a notice of substitution of counsel signed by former counsel, new counsel and the client. Court
approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the notice of substitution that counsel will
comply with the existing hearing schedule and deadlines. 51
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The differences are notable, if not, striking. Under the Utah Federal Rules of Practice, the
onus is on the unrepresented party (former client) to notify the court and opposing counsel
of new representation or intention to act in person. By contrast, under the Utah State Rules,
the onus is on the opposing party who is required to serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel to the unrepresented party. The failure to deliver the appropriate Notice to Appear
or Appoint Counsel has been held by the Utah Supreme Court as sufficient grounds to set
aside default judgment against a personal defendant. 52 53
By comparison, under Rule 15 of the Ontario Rules, a party’s solicitor may only withdraw or
be removed as solicitor of record where (1) a Notice of Change of Solicitors from successor
counsel is served; (2) the personal defendant delivers a Notice of Intention to Act in Person;
or (3) by order of the court. 54One may argue that Rule 74 of the Utah State Rules is much
fairer than the corresponding Rule 83.1-4(b) of the Utah Federal Rules of Practice, as it
provides a procedural safeguard to unrepresented personal defendants. Whether or not the
same is true for unrepresented corporate defendants is considered below.
(2) Standing for unrepresented (pro se) corporate litigants
The Utah Code does not include any provision requiring a corporation to be represented by
legal counsel. A statute did exist, Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40, prohibiting corporations and
associations from practicing law, but it was repealed by Laws 2001, c. 4 § 3, eff. April 30,
2001. The prohibition appears to remain in effect under case law, however. The Utah
Supreme Court observed in Tracy-Burke Assoc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, "It has long been
the law of [Utah] that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed
attorney." 55
There is no corresponding federal rule prohibiting a corporation from representing itself in
court. However, the prohibition exists through case law, including a U.S. Supreme Court
decision in which the court recognized, "It has been the law for the better part of two
centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed
counsel." 56 Similarly, in CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon 57 the California Court of
Appeal held that a corporation may not represent itself in a court of record either in propria
persona or through an officer or agent who is not an attorney. However, the California Court
of Appeal did note that:
In federal courts there has been a consistent pattern during the last 40 years to dismiss a
corporation that initially appears via a nonattorney officer or shareholder only after the
corporation has been given a reasonable time to secure counsel.58 59
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Interestingly, in USA v. Shield, the plaintiff’s affidavit also contained an exhibit memo dated
May 3, 2002 from a US Department of Justice paralegal specialist, which read in part:
“ The issues to be research [sic] in this case are whether clients are required to respond to
pleadings received after counsel has withdrawn from the case and whether the clients and/or
defendants can suffer default for lack of response.
The courts have repeatedly held that corporations and other organizations, such as Shield
Development Co., Ltd. and Anyox Metals Ltd., must be represented by counsel. Failure to
appoint substitute counsel can justify entry of a default, if the corporation was notified that it
may not proceed pro se. See R Maganlal v. M.G. Chemical Co., Inc., 1996 WL 420234
(S.D.N.Y.) July 25, 1996). The Defendants, Shield Development and Anyox Metals, should
have appointed substitute counsel to handle their case shortly after Judge Sam granted the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Defendants in September 1999, to date Notice of
Substitution of Counsel has not been filed with the Court. The Defendants’ failure to appoint
substitute counsel has provided DOJ with additional justification for entering default
judgment.” 60

A contrario, the Ontario Rules do not contain an absolute prohibition against pro se corporate
litigants.61 62Moreover, the Ontario Rules mandate that an order for removal of counsel as
solicitor of record for a corporation must contain the following text:
15.04(6) A client that is a corporation shall, within 30 days after being served with the order
removing the solicitor from the record,
(a) appoint a new solicitor of record by serving a notice under subrule 15.03 (2); or
(b) obtain and serve an order under subrule 15.01 (2) granting it leave to be
represented by a person other than a solicitor. O. Reg. 739/94, s. 1 (2); O. Reg. 536/96, s. 1.
(7) If the corporation fails to comply with subrule (6),
(a) the court may dismiss its proceeding or strike out its defence; and
(b) in an appeal,
(i)
a judge of the appellate court may, on motion, dismiss the
corporation’s appeal, or
(ii)
the court hearing the appeal may deny it the right to be heard.
O. Reg. 171/98, s. 1.63

The principles of order and fairness are reflected in the provisions of Rule 15.04 allowing a
corporation to participate in the courts without legal counsel and to be notified of its rights,
obligations and sanctions for inaction, following withdrawal by counsel. It is submitted that
an additional factor for the defence of natural justice should be a determination of whether
the foreign judgment was granted by the foreign court whose procedural system afforded a
corporate defendant rights of appearance and notice similar to the domestic enforcing court.
(3) Sanctions for failure to respond to requests to admit
The sanctions for failure to respond to documentary requests to admit differ between the
American and Ontario procedural systems. A party’s failure to respond to a request for
admissions under Rule 36 of Fed. R. Civ. P. may result in a material fact being deemed
admitted and subject the party to an adverse grant of summary judgment.64 However, in the
case of U.S. v. Turk,65 District Judge Hebert F. Murray held that the court was not bound to
deem as admitted unanswered requests for admissions by a pro se defendant, where to do so

10
would be contrary to the interests of justice and unduly prejudicial to the defendant’s rights.
Judge Murray expressed his reluctance “to grant summary judgment against a pro se
defendant based solely upon his failure to comply with the discovery requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 66 Although the Ontario Rules also contemplate Requests
to Admit and provide for deemed admissions where no response is forthcoming, 67 they also
contain the following important caveat under Rule 19.01 which reads:
FACTS MUST ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO JUDGMENT
19.06 A plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on a motion for judgment or at trial merely
because the facts alleged in the statement of claim are deemed to be admitted, unless the facts
entitle the plaintiff to judgment. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 19.06.

The potential harshness of facing a default judgment resulting from the failure to respond to
admissions effectively deprives a party of the opportunity to contest the merits of a case.
While judicial policy may be to insure the orderly disposition of cases and parties to a lawsuit
must comply with the rules of procedure, where a pro se corporation does not have any right
of appearance or right to file documents, its knowledge of the law and legal procedure (e.g.
whether it is entitled to withdraw admissions or respond to a request to admissions) is a nonsequitur. Therefore, it is submitted that an additional factor for the defence of natural justice
should be whether or not a foreign rule of procedure was intended to be used as a technical
weapon to defeat the rights of pro se litigants to have their cases fairly judged on the merits. 68
(4) Legal standard for summary judgment and/or default judgment.
In her reasons, Justice Herman noted the Ontario test for summary judgment as follows:
[5] Rule 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 provides that the
court shall grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial. The
United States submits that the only genuine issue to be determined is a question of law and
that is whether the judgment in the United States meets the applicable test in Canadian law for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is its position that there are no
factual issues for the court to decide and no genuine issues for trial.
…
[7] The defendants further submit that, while it may be that at trial the burden of
establishing either of these two defences rests with them, that is not the case in a summary
judgment motion. They cite the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Hi-Tech Group
Inc. v. Sears Canada Inc. (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 97, [2001] O.J. No. 33 (C.A.), at p. 105 O.R., as
authority for the proposition that the legal burden to establish that there is no genuine issue
for trial rests on the moving party and does not shift. However, that principle does not relieve
the party opposing summary judgment of the need to demonstrate that there is "a real chance
of success" (Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 60, at para. 27). 69
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There are a few American cases in which the defendant's failure to appear in court results in
summary judgment. In Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Herbert, 70the court granted
summary judgment against the pro se defendants after they had failed to respond to plaintiff's
requests for admissions, or to appear at the hearing. The court noted its discretion in
granting summary judgment and its leniency towards pro se defendants in warning the
consequences of failing to respond. The responses to plaintiff's requests for admission were
deemed admitted upon defendants' failure to respond, which formed the basis for summary
judgment. 71
Similarly, in Gittens v. Garlocks Sealing Technologies, 72 the New York court granted summary
judgment against a pro se plaintiff who had failed to respond to defendant's motion for
summary judgment and to appear at the hearing. While the court noted the failure to
respond and appear, in and of itself, did not constitute grounds for summary judgment, the
statement of facts were deemed admitted through plaintiff's failure to respond and, "if those
facts show summary judgment is appropriate, summary judgment should be granted." 73
Rule 56(c) of Fed. R. Civ. P. specifies that “admissions on file” can be an appropriate basis
for granting summary judgment. 74Since Rule 36 admissions, whether express or by default,
are conclusive as to the matters admitted, they cannot be overcome at the summary
judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary
judgment record.75 Instead, the proper course for a litigant that wishes to avoid the
consequences of failing to timely respond to Rule 36 requests for admission is to move the
court to amend or withdraw the default admissions in accordance with the standard outlined
in Rule 36(b).76 Although Rule 36(b) of Fed. R. Civ. P. provides discretion to the court to
allow a party to withdraw or amendment of an admission, this is of little solace to a foreign
pro se corporate defendant who has not been apprised of the availability of this procedure.
A Final Remark on Finality
The issue of notice was central to the court’s analysis in USA v. Shield. However, whether or
not service was properly effected begs the question of whether the corporate defendants
were afforded basic or fundamental rights of natural justice under the Utah federal rules of
court, after their Utah Counsel were removed as counsel of record. Mr. Sheridan’s
explanation for not responding to his former Utah Counsel was that he was involved in an
head on accident in 1997 while riding in a taxi which affected him both physically and
mentally and affected his recollection of events.77 However, the real issue is whether the fact
that Shield and Anyox, having attorned to the Utah jurisdiction, thereafter were bound by all
subsequent proceedings. Clearly, Justice Herman considered the mis-delivery of some of the
court documents, including the motion for summary judgment, as “procedural irregularities”
which did not raise a triable defence of breach of natural justice. The ratio of Herman, J.’s
analysis is succinctly summarized as follows:
[31] The allegation of a breach of natural justice cannot in my view, be sustained in this case.
The defendants were aware of the legal proceedings in the United States and had retained
Utah counsel. Their counsel had filed documents in court on their behalf and, as part of this,
advised the court that the defendants' address was the corporate address. They would have
received that information from the defendants. The defendants continued to maintain a
mailbox at that address. Although two items were sent to the wrong address, the notification
of the hearing date and a copy of the judgment were sent to the correct corporate address.
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[32] Utah counsel obtained an order to remove themselves from the record because the
defendants had not paid their bills and had not communicated with them. The defendants did
nothing further although they were aware that there was ongoing litigation. Their actions
suggest that they made a choice to walk away from the proceedings.
[33] Whether the defendants would be successful in setting aside the judgment in the United
States would be a matter for the American courts to decide, but the existence of such a
remedy is further support for the proposition that there has not been a breach of natural
justice.

The court’s analysis fails to consider that a foreign judgment must be final and res judicata in
the originating jurisdiction, before it can be enforced in Canada. 78Granted, recent Canadian
jurisprudence, notably, Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc. (currently on reserve before the Supreme
Court of Canada) 79 may alter the finality requirement. However, aside from whether
ineffective service constitutes a denial of natural justice, the circumstances under which
summary judgment is granted through non-appearance merits further scrutiny by Canadian
courts asked to enforce the foreign judgment. In USA v. Shield, once Utah counsel was
removed as counsel of record, the corporate defendants were prohibited from filing any
responding materials, including a response to Requests for Admissions or response to the
motion for summary judgment, unless they retained legal counsel. Hence, the right to
counsel is both substantive and procedural in nature. In fact, if it is mandated under the
original forum's procedural rules, while in Ontario, a corporation has the right to seek leave
to appoint an officer of the corporation to represent it in the proceedings.
The defence of natural justice in the context of foreign default judgment enforcement
involving pro se corporate defendants should include the following analytical inquiry:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Was default judgment granted against a corporate defendant who previously
attorned or submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction?
Is the foreign judgment final or res judicata in the foreign jurisdiction (i.e. all
rights of appeal and time limitations to set aside the foreign judgment have
been exhausted)?
If so, was default judgment granted against the corporate defendant in
circumstances involving defective service under the foreign court’s
procedure?
If not, was the defendant represented by counsel at the time default
judgment was granted?
If the corporate defendant was unrepresented at any stage of the foreign
proceedings, did the foreign court’s procedural system afford the corporate
defendant a right of appearance and notice similar to those available in the
Canadian domestic enforcing court?
Was the foreign judgment obtained based upon a foreign rule of procedure
intended to be used as a technical weapon to defeat the rights of pro se
litigants to have their cases fairly judged on the merits?

As one learned American judge has remarked: “The sword of Damocles causes harm
because it hangs, not necessarily because it drops.” 80 Whether a defendant is a natural person
or artificial entity, all Canadians deserve the benefit of the same procedural rights and
recognized defences to enforcement of foreign judgments within the Canadian legal system.

13

* B.A. (Hons.), LL.B. Litigation Counsel, Steinberg Morton Hope & Israel LLP, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
OBA-AGR Liaison, International Law Section. I wish to thank Mr. H. Scott Fairley of Theall & Associates,
who acted as co-counsel for the USA in the proceedings, for providing a copy of the Appeal Book and
Compendium which greatly assisted my research for this case comment. I gratefully acknowledge the able
research assistance of Mr. Dennis Flynn, Attorney-at-Law, of the Utah law firm, Winder & Haslam, for his
insights on American civil procedure, generally. The opinions expressed and any errors or omissions are
exclusively mine.
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Shield”]
9 According to the AGEISS Environmental, Inc. Final Letter Report (Essex Copper Site-US EPA) dated
August 28, 1995, “On January 5, 1984, Shield, then owner of the Site, won a judgement against TTI [Toledo
Technologies, Inc.] (then TMC) [Toledo Mining Company] and EGI [Essex Group, Inc.]. As a result, EGI’s
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challenges the way in which the law has been applied. That, in my opinion, goes beyond the scope of
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establish that there are no genuine issues for trial, the defendants must show that there is a "real chance
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In my opinion, two developments should be recognized in connection with this defence. First, the
requirements of notice and a hearing should be construed in a purposive and flexible manner.
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'The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I
remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God
himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence.'
In an oft-cited dissent, Justice Frankfurter in Caritativo v. California 357 U.S. 549; 78 S. Ct. 1263; 2 L. Ed. 2d
1531; 1958 U.S. LEXIS 670 (U.S.S.C.) opined:
27
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32 The removal consisted of cleanup and disposal of approximately 2,200 gallons of phenol liquids, 1.070
gallons of caustic powders, 12 polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) contaminated transformers, 40 PCBcontaminated capacitors, 220 gallons of mercury contaminated soil and debris, and approximately 15 cubic
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43 Transcript of the Cross-Examination of John Patrick Sheridan on his Affidavit sowrn October 5th, 2004 on
October 19, 2004, Appellants’ Appeal Book and Compendium, Court of Appeal File No. C42849/Court File
No. 04-CV-266938 CM2, pages 59-62, Questions 92-106.
44 USA v. Shield, id.,, per Herman, J. at 588.
45 USA v. Shield, id.,, per Herman, J. at 589; Order of Chief Judge David Sam Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel
for Developments Shield Development Co., Ltd. and Anyox Metals, Ltd. dated September dated September 10,
1999 and effective September 14, 1999, Appellants’ Appeal Book and Compendium, Court of Appeal File No.
C42849/Court File No. 04-CV-266938 CM2, pages 147-148.
46 USA v. Shield, id.,, per Herman, J. at 589.
47 Order of Judge Ted Stewart granting the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2000,
Appellants’ Appeal Book and Compendium, Court of Appeal File No. C42849/Court File No. 04-CV-266938
CM2, pages 235-237.
48 USA v. Shield, supra., per Herman, J. at 591-2.
49 The timing of Utah Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel further compounded their former clients’
predicament. The court record confirms that Utah Counsel was served with the First Set of Requests for
Admissions by the US on September 9, 1999. The order allowing withdrawal was granted by Judge Sam on
September 10, 1999, but was effective on September 14, 1999. Quaere whether Utah Counsel failed to comply
with Rule 83-1.4(2) of the Utah Federal Rules of Practice. A review of the letters filed as exhibits in support of
Utah Counsel’s motion for withdrawal advised Shield and Anyox of settlement negotiations between the US
Department of Justice and the current owners of the Essex mine, and also confirmed a subsequent request by
the USA for referral of the case to mediation. However, there is no reference to the possible sanctions
(including the prospect of default/summary judgment) arising from failure to deliver any response to the
Requests for Admissions. Furthermore, Mr. Sheridan was not notified that Shield and Anyox had to retain new
counsel and could not proceed unrepresented. See discussion infra, re: standing for unrepresented (pro se)
corporate litigants.. See also, Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel for the Defendants, including Certification of
Counsel; Letter from Utah Counsel to Sheridan dated May 6, 1999 (Exhibit A) and June 16, 1999 (Exhibit B),
Appellants’ Appeal Book and Compendium, Court of Appeal File No. C42849/Court File No. 04-CV-266938
CM2, pages 131-146.
50 Rule 83 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. empowers each district court to establish local rules governing its practice and
reads:
42

Rule 83. Rules by District Courts; Judge's Directives
(a) Local Rules.
(1) Each district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may, after giving appropriate public
notice and an opportunity for comment, make and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall
be consistent with -- but not duplicative of -- Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§
2072 and 2075, and shall conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. A local rule takes effect on the date specified by the district court and
remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit. Copies
of rules and amendments shall, upon their promulgation, be furnished to the judicial council and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be made available to the public.
(2) A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner that causes a party to
lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with the requirement.
(b) Procedures When There is No Controlling Law
A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072 and 2075, and local rules of the district. No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district rules unless
the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement.
CJA 04-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. Repeal. Included in URCP 74. 1-Nov-03; URCP 074.
Withdrawal of counsel. New. Replaces 4-506. Regulates process for withdrawing from representation. 1-Nov-
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03 URCP 074. Withdrawal of counsel. Amend. Modifies content of notice/request to withdraw. 1-Apr-04. The
legislative history of Rule 74 is available on the Utah State Courts website available online at
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/ (last visited on August 29, 2006)
52 See e.g., Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,¶¶7-13, 982 P.2d 586 (stating former Rule 4-506 compels
opposing counsel to file required notice and requires trial court to wait twenty days before holding proceedings,
thus the trial court erred by striking wife's pleadings and placing her in default after her counsel's motion to
withdraw). Cf. Tebbs Family Partnership v. Rex , 2001 UT APP 88 (Utah Court of Appeals) which held:
“Rex argues that his prior counsel's withdrawal in the midst of ongoing discovery and a pending motion
for summary judgment constitutes excusable neglect because the trial court did not approve of the
motion to withdraw, thereby violating Rule 4-506(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Mr.
Mitchell filed notice of withdrawal on September 28, 1998. TFP submitted a notice to appoint new
counsel or appear pro se to Rex on October 6, 1998. The trial court granted summary judgment on
January 4, 1999, nearly four months after Mr. Mitchell's withdrawal. Thus, while there was a technical violation
of Rule 4-506(1), we cannot say that, in this instance, the same amounted to either excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)
or an irregularity in the proceedings under Rule 59(a)(1).
Rex asserts that his prior counsel's failure to file a counter-affidavit stating that the money due under the
notes was not in fact due, Rex's failure to retain replacement counsel after Mr. Mitchell withdrew, but
before entry of summary judgment against him, and Mitchell's alleged failure to adequately explain the
consequences of the motion for summary judgment before withdrawing, constitutes excusable neglect.
However, Rex cites no case law in support of his argument.
While these incidents might have constituted neglect on the part of prior counsel, Rex fails to
adequately explain how they give rise to "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1). See, e.g., ParkeChapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 913 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating, "attorney errors such as
preoccupation with other matters, irresponsibility of counsel, tactical decisions and misreading of
procedural rules" do not rise to level of "excusable neglect"). This is particularly true in light of the fact that a
review of the record reveals that Rex received notice to appoint counsel after Mr. Mitchell withdrew. [emphasis added;
citation omitted]
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See USA v. Shield, supra, per Herman, J. at 590, where the learned judge notes:
[18] Rule 5(b) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service on a party represented
by an attorney is made on the attorney unless ordered otherwise. Rule 83-1.4 of the District of Utah
Civil Rules provides that where an attorney withdraws or is removed or otherwise ceases to act as
attorney of record, the party must notify the clerk of the appointment of another attorney or of his or
her decision to represent himself or herself within 20 days. If the party is retaining new counsel, he or
she must provide the clerk with contact information. A party who is proceeding on his or her own,
must provide an address and telephone number. The defendants did not do this after their counsel was
removed.

See Rule 15.03 of the Ontario Rules.
Tracy-Burke Assoc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 699 P.2d 687 at 688. (Utah 1985).
56 Rowland v. Calif. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993)(citations omitted).
57 CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141 (Cal. Court of Appeal, 1st App. Dist.).
58 Id. citing: Southwest Exp. Co., Inc. v. I.C.C. (5th Cir. 1982) 670 F.2d 53: proceedings held in abeyance for 18
days to allow corporation to cure deficiencies in its petition, including lack of attorney signature; United States v.
9.19 Acres of Land, Marquette Co., Mich. (6th Cir. 1969) 416 F.2d 1244: trial court abused its discretion in denying
continuance when nonattorney corporate president learns one week before trial he cannot represent
corporation and cannot locate an attorney; Strong Del. Min. Ass’n v. Board of App. of Cook Cty. (7th Cir. 1976) 543
F.2d 32: corporation whose complaint filed by nonattorney president given leave to file an amended complaint
by locally licensed attorney; U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 1244: “perfectly
appropriate” to enter default judgment against corporation when corporation’s president/sole shareholder does
not follow court order to obtain counsel; Flora Construction Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1962)
307 F.2d 413: defendant corporation that appears via its nonattorney president allowed time to secure attorney;
Sermor, Inc. v. U.S. (1987) 13 Cl. Ct. 1: court does not abuse discretion in dismissing action after giving
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nonattorney corporate president every opportunity to cure the corporation’s failure to be represented by
counsel.
59 See also, Harrison v. Wahatoyas, LLC, 253 F.3d 552, 556 (10th Cir. 2001) (“As a general matter, a corporation or
other business entity can only appear in court through an attorney and not through a non-attorney corporate
officer appearing pro se.”); DeVilliers v. Atlas Corp., 360 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1966) (“[A] corporation can
appear in a court of record only by an attorney at law.”); Flora Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 307 F.2d
413, 414 (10th Cir. 1962) (“The rule is well established that a corporation can appear in a court of record only
by an attorney at law.”). See also Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (“It has been the
law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through
licensed counsel.”); Commercial & R.R. Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60, 65
(1840) (“[A] corporation cannot appear but by attorney. . . .”) overruled in part by 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 830 (1824) (“A corporation, it is true, can appear only
by attorney, while a natural person may appear for himself.”). See generally Strong Delivery Ministry Ass’n v. Bd. of
Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 33-34 (7th Cir. 1976) (explaining the justification for the rule).
60 Memorandum from Margaret A. Gallegos, Paralegal Specialist, DOJ, Denver Field Office to Bob Homiak
dated May 3, 2002, Exhibit 29 to the Affidavit of Robert R. Homiak, Senior Attorney, US Department of
Justice (Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division) sworn June 2,
2004, Appellants’ Appeal Book and Compendium, Court of Appeal File No. C42849/Court File No. 04-CV266938 CM2, pages 238-242 at 239.
61 Rule 15.01(2) of the Ontario Rules provides:
15.01(2) A party to a proceeding that is a corporation shall be represented by a solicitor, except with
leave of the court. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 15.01 (2). [emphasis added]
62 For the factors in determining whether leave should be granted under Rule 15.01(2), see the decision of
Master Sandler in 419212 Ontario Ltd. v. Astrochrome Crankshaft (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 116 (Ont. Gen. Div.); See
also Susin (c.o.b. Romano Construction Co.) v. Frid Construction Co. (1993) 67 O.A.C. 353, (1993) 43 A.C.W.S. (3d)
359 (Ont. C.A.) and Advance Fine Auto Sales & Service Inc. v. Ontario (Minister of Transportation) [2001] O.J. No.
1555 (Ont. S.C.J.) (unreported).
63 Rule 15.04(6) and (7) of the Ontario Rules.
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